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AUTHORITY

AGO ltr dtd 11 Jun 1980

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HEADQUARTERS  
ADVISORY TEAM 65 (SADEC PROVINCE)  
DELTA REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMAND  
APO 96215

MACDR-65-DPSA

2 February 1973

SUBJECT: AFRIS - Deputy Province Senior Advisor Completion of Tour  
Report (RCS MACCORDS 174-03) LTC Earl L. Putnam, 445-30-6354

THRU: DEPCORDS  
Delta Regional Assistance Command  
APO 96215

TO: Commander  
Headquarters, Military Assistance Command Vietnam  
ATTN: MACCORDS, RA  
APO 96222



1. Attached is the Deputy Province Senior Advisor's completion of tour report completed by the undersigned for the period 16 December 1972 to 28 January 1973.

2. Due to the fact that my tour as a Deputy Province Senior Advisor in SaDec Province was of an extremely short duration, coupled with the fact that I am now assigned to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, located in Vinh Long Province, my remarks must of necessity be limited in scope. I did not have ample time in the position to become sufficiently familiar with many of the program that should be addressed; therefore, I must honestly decline comment where I lack the expertise to provide a meaningful response.

The Province Senior Advisor, Mr. Robert Traister, will submit a separate report covering all areas of interest. His report, reflecting his detailed knowledge of all programs within SaDec Province, will undoubtedly fill all the requirement for ascertaining the status of SaDec.

The tour of duty as DPSA of SaDec, although of extremely short duration, was an extremely interesting, challenging, and personally satisfying experience. The vast majority of the people of that Province are unquestionably friendly to Americans and responsive to the GVN.

DAMO-ODU  
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The Province Chief, his staff and subordinate commanders were at all times friendly, cooperative and hospitable. They were responsive to advise and assistance from the small number of US military personnel assigned to CORDS Team 65.

EARL L. PUTNAM  
LTC ARMOR  
Deputy Province Senior Advisor

SECTION I

NAME: PUTNAM, Earl L.

GRADE: LTC

SSAN: 445-30-6354

BRANCH: Armor

PROVINCE: SADEC

INCLUSIVE DATES OF TOUR: 16 Dec 72 - 27 Jan 73

EXPECTED REASSIGNMENT DATE: 26 Mar 73

PREVIOUS TOUR IN VIETNAM: 8 Sep 66 - 18 Aug 67

ASSIGNMENT ON PREVIOUS VIETNAM TOUR: S-3, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry  
(6 months)  
G-3, (plans). 4th Infantry Division  
(6 months)

## SECTION II

1. What background did you have for your position?

Over seventeen years experience as a Combat Arms Army Officer, attendance at a variety of military schools and one previous tour in Vietnam.

2. What training did you have for this position?

Ten weeks at the PSA Course, JFK SWC, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

3. What additional training would you suggest for your position?

More training in the civil aspects of our pacification program to include more in depth briefings on arrival in Saigon.

4. What should be the length of tour for your position?

Eighteen months.

5. Was support from Region and/or Saigon Headquarters satisfactory?

Yes, to my knowledge.

6. a. Were there any programs delayed because support was not forthcoming?

Not to my knowledge.

b. Were there any programs that were especially successful because support was readily available?

Unknown.

7. No comment.

8. No comment.

9. No comment.

10. No comment.

11. No comment.

12. No comment.

13. No comment.

14. No comment.

15. No comment.

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SECTION II CONT'D

16. The rural people are aware of the pacification efforts the GVN and US are making.

17. The people, as you know them, are more committed to the GVN than when you assumed your job. Why?

The Province Chief has made a concerted effort to send teams to the villages and hamlets to inform the populace of the GVN's position. He has made numerous personal appearances at these meetings and has insured that full representation from his staff is made available at village and hamlet level.

18. Do you feel that the pacification plan is sufficiently detailed to provide guidance and set goals that will result in security and growth of Vietnam?

Yes.



SECTION III  
FUNCTIONAL AREAS

TERRITORIAL SECURITY DIRECTORATE

RF/PF

Territorial forces have made a significant contribution to the pacification effort in this province. The measurement of security is dramatically illustrated by the fact that the MES rating for all villages and hamlets is A - B. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the VC have been unable to cause any serious difficulty within province prior to or immediately after the date of the ceasefire.

Several factors have contributed to the success of the territorial forces in sector. Paramount has been the effectiveness of the Province Chief, Deputy Sector Commander for Security and the District Chiefs in their planning and supervision of operations.

Major failings of the territorial forces within SaDec Province are:

- a. Laxity in the maintenance of defensive positions (outposts). Several of the outposts have been allowed to deteriorate; specifically, grass has been permitted to grow too high around the positions (providing potential concealment during an attack), obstacles have not been continually improved, and claymore mines in many cases do not have fuses to permit their employment. These items have been discussed with all concerned, some progress is being made, but ever so slowly.
- b. There are an inadequate number of personnel properly trained in the adjustment of field artillery. Some training is done but precious little actual firing has been accomplished.
- c. Logistical problems remain unsolved. Specific examples include a failure to provide rice to distant outposts for extended periods of time (six months or longer) and no provision is available for providing such items as replacement blasting caps for claymore mines' to defensive positions.

### SECTION III CONT'D

#### PSDF.

Overall the performance of the PSDF has been one of continuing improvement. The most impressive single item pertaining to the PSDF to illustrate their effectiveness occurred on 10 January 1973. On that date, with only two hours notice, the PSDF were asked to provide security along several canals during a short visit by MG Tarpley. This request was placed through the National Police radio net to the Village Security Chiefs. The PSDF responded to this short-time-frame request and were present at all critical locations. In addressing their overall effectiveness my evaluation is that by and large the PSDF are making a concerted effort to provide the requisite degree of security to the villages and hamlets. Their problems of a lack of sufficient leaders to accomplish requisite tasks will pose difficulties to the continuing improvement of the PSDF.

#### PUBLIC SAFETY DIRECTORATE

Unfortunately, my very short tour as PSDF did not permit me to become sufficiently familiar with the National Police operations to provide meaningful comments.

This comment is also applicable to the:

- Community Development Directorate
- Refugee Directorate
- Chieu Hoi Directorate
- Reports and Analysis Directorate
- Agency for International Development

Rather than provide sketchy comments to the above mentioned areas of interest I prefer to make not comment at all. Again, the PSA's report (Mr. Robert Traister) should be examined for these areas of interest.

#### SECTION IV

##### SPECIAL INTEREST ITEMS

a. Final overall assessment of pacification.

Currently, SaDec Province well deserves its reputation of being one of the three most pacified provinces in the Republic of Vietnam.

In my short tour of duty I traveled throughout the Province by air, road and canal and was totally impressed with the relative security and distinct friendliness of the populace toward myself and my counterparts.

Unless there is a significant introduction of VC/NVA troops from outside of the Province, SaDec should remain as one of the safest, most stable Provinces in South Vietnam.

The Province Chief, Col Nuynh Ngoc Diep, is completely "on top" of the situation in SaDec; as long as he remains in position, I visualize no serious difficulty to the continued stability of the Province. Were he to be replaced the situation could degenerate rapidly under a less capable leader.

b. What major problems exist or are expected to emerge?

Again, I see no major difficulty as there is no major introduction of VC/NVA forces and the current province chief remains in position.

c. Appropriate suggested solutions and recommendations to be taken by the follow-on US civilian organization.

In view of the fact that the current PSA, Mr. Robert Traister, is programmed to remain in a position where in he will monitor SaDec Province I make no comment. His expertise, deep affection for SaDec Province, and stature with the populace is such that it would be extremely presumptuous of me to make any comments herein. I am confident that no other PSA in-country has a greater rapport with his counterpart or knowledge of the area of operations.

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